This is the best book on the Great War that I have read in many a year. Well written in an engaging style, it is founded on excellent research and good, common sense. It single-handedly destroys much of the mythology and misunderstanding of the 1916 Battle of the Somme and I applaud the author for that.

The Somme was not about one day, as so many books, TV programmes, press articles and battlefield tours would still have us believe. It was a huge affair of several quite different phases over five months, in which it could be argued that the British army finally came to the big boy's game. "Bloody Victory" puts it into proper context - and that means concentration on French strategy, tactics and fighting, for they dominated the reason why Britain fought this battle and why it fought they way it did, where it did, and when it did. I learned a great deal from this book about the French part of the Somme: the leadership struggles, tactical development and the stages of the fighting. Philpott argues clearly with regard to the Allies attritional strategy, highlights great successes in September 1916 and the over-long plunge into morale-sapping fights in the mud and dark of October and November. Out of it all comes a sense that the British army had come on by leaps and bounds from 1 July to the successful assaults of November, not least in the realisation that man for man, this new army was the equal of the world's best. For Britain, the Somme was not seen at the time as a defeat - far from it - but somehow (not least thanks to the self-interested poison pens of Churchill and Lloyd George) it soon came to feel like it was. The author explores French, British and German operations, effects and legacies in truly masterly fashion.

This is a reprint by Pen & Sword in what appears to be a concerted effort to make freshly available a number of the 'classics' despite the fact that 'The ironclads of Cambrai' is one of those books on the Great War that you still see often in second hand book shops, notably the paperback versions of the 1967 original.

Bryan Cooper's work is fluent and to the point, and remains a good starting point for anyone wishing to learn about Cambrai, increasingly being seen as a turning point in British tactical development during the war. It is a readable account and good value.

'Ironclads' was written at a time when historians and authors did not enjoy the same access to operational records and personal service records that we have today. As such, it draws largely on official and regimental accounts (principally British ones) and is inevitably shaped and limited by what they have to say. Even so, the author makes the account lively if a little impersonal. It also covers well the limited but gallant role of the tanks in stemming the German counter attack of 30 November 1917. As an assessment of the battle it has been overtaken by modern scholarship, perhaps best represented by Bryn Hammond's "Cambrai 1917: the myth of the first great tank battle" and Jack Sheldon's "The German Army at Cambrai". Both offer a more balanced and informed account and in particular do much to add weight to the effect of the new British artillery tactics in assisting the tanks to achieve so much on 20 November 1917. Even so, this is a nicely produced and welcome reprint.

Simon Jones' "Underground warfare" is a welcome addition to work covering the mining and sapping operations on the Western Front. The subject has received little (but generally high quality) coverage in the past but attention has been raised in recent years by TV documentaries and the novel "Birdsong". Certainly more people are now aware that there were teams of engineers and navvies at work, fighting a claustrophobic and deadly war below the trenches.

This book takes us through the evolution of underground warfare, beginning with a brief history of military mining since the 1700's, through the tentative work in France in 1914 and 1915, to the spectacular tactical effects of mine and tunnel works in 1916 and 1917. I was particularly glad to see that it spans German and French efforts, as well as the British, and provides perhaps the best overview to date. The subject is necessarily technical, but Jones manages very well the difficult balance between providing enough coverage of the engineering and munitions aspects and making the book a readable work that will appeal to many. It should not be regarded as a reference work for military mining, but as an excellent overview of how it came about, why it was considered important, what took place and the effects it had. Similarly it is not a history of the Royal Engineers Tunnelling Companies, although their formation, organisation and command are covered and indeed British organisation of its underground work is considered by the author to be superior to the German. It is illustrated with plenty of useful diagrams, maps, technical drawings and photographs.

I certainly enjoyed reading it, learned a few things and can recommend it to anyone interested in trench warfare. The Great War was not just about infantry going "over the top" and "Underground warfare" adds to our understanding of a key aspect of the fighting.

I have a confession to make. I knew the late John Terraine and to this day regard him as one of our finest historians. His turn of phrase is powerful and his insight quite remarkable. It's hard to believe that he published "Mons" fifty years ago; nearer to the battle in years than to our present day and at a time when Great War veterans were plentiful and in the prime of their lives. His masterly work in researching and writing for the BBC's famous series "The Great War" was still three years into his future.

At the time he wrote "Mons", there was no access to the unit war diaries and many of the other primary documents that today's historians regard as the essential planks of their tools. His written sources were the Official History and published memoirs, but John also had access to the personal (and comparatively fresh) memories of soldiers. He also wrote at a time when the Great War was slipping from public consciousness, overwhelmed by the more recent events of WW2 and against a rising tide of anti-war, anti-authority, anti-class sentiment. John would later find all barrels turned against him for his defence of Douglas Haig, when he became a very lone voice in a world full of 'lions led by donkeys' mythologies. But "Mons" pre-dated his work on Haig and John was in 1960 pretty well unknown in the world of Great War literature.

As a study of the battle, "Mons" stands the test of time remarkably well. The title is if anything a little misleading for the scope of the book is not just the stand of a few hours on the canal bank at Mons on 23 August 1914 but the searing experience of the retreat that followed and the strategic defeat of the enemy on the Marne. This is not a book for anyone wishing to find the pinpoint detail of where the 2nd Umpshires were at 3pm on 27 August or how Lance Corporal X won his DCM. But for those wishing to understand battle, confusion and the problems of working in a coalition of allies, it is deservedly a classic. John dedicated "Mons" to the Old Contemptibles; more than anything he is utterly sympathetic to their plight and the efforts they made.

No question. If you have not read "Mons", do so.

PS. As a matter of interest I once asked John which of his works he rated as the finest. Knowing him primarily as a Great War historian, his answer surprised me but on recently re-reading it I think I understand why. "The right of the line", his superb work on the Royal Air Force in WW2, was his selection.

On receiving this book I idly opened it at a random page and found that it was discussing Frederick John Roberts, an officer of the 12th Sherwood Foresters who played a large part in editing and producing the trench journal, the "Wipers Times". My eyebrows were raised when I read that he did not appear in the Army List and that his Military Cross has no citation, as though he was some kind of neglected or shunned figure. (He does, and MC's awarded as part of the New Year's Honours never had citations). I flicked around, finding that that Ypres was being shelled on Armistice Day (really?). A start to finish read revealed more curious misunderstandings, misinformation or lack of research.

Possibly the greatest example in a book examining the war at Ypres is when the author questions why the paper made no mention of the Battle of the Somme in early July 1916, yet raised its hat to the Canadians. "There is no report of a recent skirmish" that would led to such a thing. That is, aside from the largest battle to have taken place in the Salient since May 1915: the Canadian recapture of Mount Sorrel on 13 June 1916 [details]! Then to wonder why, on 3 July 1916, no mention is made of a battle many miles away and just two days before reveals an absence of understanding of how the "Wipers Times" was actually produced. It probably took more than two days to typeset!

A whole chapter is made of the author's quest to solve the 'riddle' of the Wipers Times correspondent, "Teech Bomas". A bit of logic on the author's part thinks it might be Beech Thomas, then trip to the newspaper archive at Colindale and a chance reading of the "Daily Mail" revealed it to be one William Beach Thomas. The unititiated might be led to believe that this was a brilliant piece of detective work: far from it. It was fully explained in Patrick Beaver's excellent 1973/1988 "The Wipers Times: a complete facsimile" - which this author quotes in "The riddles of Wipers"!

If you can put aside these things, there is some interesting content. The poetry, funny stories, pet placenames and jargon used in the "Wipers Times" is placed in context of the terrible fighting that went on at Ypres from October 1914 to the same month four years on. The author does this not by chronology but by theme, looking in turn at the conditions in which the men found themselves and the nature of trench warfare, then at the men themselves and the social and morale contexts behind the words. Especially for anyone who has walked those fields and visited the places, it is evocative indeed. But I am afraid that on the whole it is not a work I shall rush to look at again.

I see that there is also another book on this subject, "Suffering from cheerfulness: poems and parodies from the 'Wipers Times'" (by Malcolm Brown, Little Books, 2007). Malcolm's previous works have been models of research. Having not seen it I can not be certain but I am willing to bet that his examination of the "Wipers Times" is worth seeing.

Better yet, seek out a copy of Patrick Beaver's book. It has been reprinted on a number of occasions and is usually freely available. Not only is a complete run of "Wipers Times" included but his end notes are excellent and you will solve far more of the 'riddles' by reading them.

They still make Zeppelins in Friedrichshafen. Small ones. You can even take a ride in one over the Bodensee towards the mountains of Switzerland if you are lucky enough. I was certainly lucky to be sent to do some work there a few years ago, to ZF, the modern form of its original name Zeppelin Friedrichshafen. ZF do not make the modern flying machines, but turn out thousands of gearboxes for cars, still at the forefront of technology. Strolling one day along the town's lake front I was delighted to visit the Zeppelin museum - all fascinating stuff and some excellent exhibits of their global flights in the 1930s, but little mention of their early warlike use. That is a great pity, for in 1914-1918 the Zepps were among the most feared of weapons. Once their great menace had been identified, the British attempted something never done before - to fly over great distances in aircraft that were puny in comparison with the Zepps, to bomb the factories and sheds not only at Friedrichshafen but also at Dusseldorf and Cuxhaven.

The Flatpack bombers (which I think is a truly awful title) offers a history of the background, execution and effect of these raids. The title itself comes from the fact that a small number of Avro 504s were dismantled, shipped in kit form to the French aerodrome at Belfort, reassembled and tested, all in the greatest of secrecy, before going on the Friedrichshafen mission. The crews and mechanics were destined to remain in the Belfort hangars, sleeping next to the machines in freezing weather, until the opportunity came to mount the raid. The stories of the three quite different targets are told clearly and well, drawing upon German as well as British official and secondary sources. The reader can only gasp at the sheer bravery and skill of the pilots, and wonder at the pinprick scale of the raids. The fact that navigation was largely by the senses and that no maps of France could be carried adds to the intrigue. Almost inevitably little damage was done, but the Germans were caused to increase their anti aircraft defences. Certainly the raids had next to no effect on the ability of Germany to use its Zeppelins against Britain and its Royal Navy.

Despite not knowing much about the war either in the air or on the sea, I enjoyed Flatpack bombers. Ian Gardiner brings the characters of the men and the derring-do, early war, feel of their exploits to life and leaves us with a valuable record of their story.

A good buy.

Eden to Armageddon pulls together in a single volume the story of the fighting in Egypt, Gallipoli, Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Hejaz, the Caucasus and Persia in the Great War: quite a challenge when it is considered that the British Official History covering these campaigns amounts to nine volumes, and that covers little of the Russian/Turkish operations in the Caucasus. The causes, campaigns, politics and outcomes are complex and have left a legacy that continues to trouble the world today. The campaigns in the Middle East are a key part of our history and it is surprising that they have received relatively little coverage in recent years - certainly in comparison with the inch by inch analysis of the first day on the Somme, for example. Eden certainly helps to put the various fragmented campaigns into context and to illustrate how they were linked and influenced each other, particularly of course as the Turkish Empire was the common enemy.

The book is well written and makes for easy reading despite the complexities of the subject. It is more about political and theatre strategy, tactics and operations that it is about men, for few individuals figure and there are no personal stories or anecdotes. It does make Eden a little dry but it is hard to see how much of the minutiae could have been included without the book becoming unwieldy.

Research seems thorough but as there are no references or bibiliography it is hard to see what has been included and discarded. This is my most serious criticism. Eden is fine to read but of little value as reference, simply because we do not know the source of the facts and arguments presented. Acknowledgements are also omitted and we get no feel for the author's motivations for writing it.

There is a good selection of black and white photographs and some clear maps, although they show the geographies rather than the campaigns. Some extensive end notes complete the book

As a starter for understanding the campaigns, it provides a good overview and goes into enough detail without the reader feeling to swamped or lost.

This book is the result of PhD study on a military aspect of the First World War that has received relatively little coverage in terms of published history. There is a good Official History and Edward Paice's "Tip and run" but little else. The campaign was complex, drawn out over a long period of time and stretched over vast geographical distances. It does not make an easy description. Ross Anderson has clearly done a good job of academic research and study, and covers the fighting and politics in considerable detail. The list of references to operational records, war diaries and official papers is impressive, and the narrative can be considered authoritative. There are few personal records or anecdotes.

I am largely unfamiliar with the terrain and placenames of East Africa. In consequence I found myself constantly having to refer to the maps that are dotted throughout. Unfortunately it is not always clear which placename appears on which map, so this was a little frustration. The maps themselves are adequate if not of particularly high quality. A section of 37 black and white photographs, not referenced but I imagine from the IWM collection, served to underscore just how different this campaign is from the more familiar story of the Western Front.

A good work of reference, which has now been reprinted in paperback.

The film "The Battle of the Somme" remains of great interest today as an icon and documentary of the period. Officially produced for propaganda purposes, it was a huge box office attraction in 1916, seen by millions at home as the battle continued to rage in France. It was even watched by the troops, in the safety of the rear areas. Certain clips from the film will be all too familiar to anyone who watches modern TV coverage of the war, for they are seen over and over again. The enormous fountain of earth exploding into the sky above the Hawthorn ridge, and advancing infantry going "over the top", with men tripping and apparently dying in their own wire, feature in virtually every production. But in the latter instance it is only "apparently", for parts of the film were faked.

Drawing on the film, photographs taken at the same times and places, and the cameramen's notes (including the memoir of the film maker Geoffrey Malins), "Ghosts on the Somme" is a painstaking detailed analysis of every second of the film. The authors have attempted to identify the places, dates and times, units involved and individuals. The shots that are faked - in some cases many miles behind the lines - are identified, too. It makes for fascinating reading. The book could be quite hard going without the dozens of photographs, film stills and "then and now" photos that it serve to illustrate the points; they are carefully chosen and make the book stand out.

Overall it is an admirable piece of work and a very good book. It is perhaps, given the level of detail, one for Great War or film buffs rather than the general reader or WW1 beginner, but most would find it enjoyable and thought-provoking reading. It certainly adds something new to the plethora of analysis and publications covering 1 July 1916. Surely no other day in military history has received and continues to receive such depth of research.

This is another in a recent run of reprints of well-known works on the Great War, published by Pen & Sword. As a study of the battle it pales in comparison with at least two more recent works ("Most unfavourable ground" by Niall Cherry and "Loos 1915" by Nicholas Lloyd), and is not up to the high standard of academic rigour we have now come to expect from such works.

Warner's treatment relies heavily on personal accounts and letters by men who were there, and these are undoubtedly the strongest and most interesting aspect of the book. These include extracts from the diary of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French. Unusually, the personal accounts are not organised by timeline but into chapters, one for each British Division that was in action. This tends to make it difficult to follow the battle as it unfolds, and Warner's opening description of the conception and execution of the battle is at too high a level for the uninformed reader to position the individual that is speaking. Read in conjunction with, or possibly after, one of the two books named above, the accounts make much more sense and do add to our understanding. There is also a clear one-page sketch map.

I would not recommend rushing out to buy "The Battle of Loos" and certainly not for anyone wishing to study the battle for the first time, but the personal content is certainly of interest and worth buying for that alone.

If you are looking for a history or analysis of the epic battle of Verdun from a military or fighting standpoint, this is not the work for you. You will be better informed by Alistair Horne's classic "The price of glory" or Malcolm Brown's "Verdun 1916".

Ian Ousby takes a look at Verdun through a rather different lens. He concentrates on the rhetoric and symbolism of France and its relations with Prussia/Germany, and concludes that these things had an enormous bearing on the path that led to and sustained such an awful battle. The very experiences and emotions of men who were there were shaped not only by their physical experience of battle, but by their attitudes and limitations of expression that were influenced by such rhetoric.

The history of the battle itself is given only in outline, although the opening bombardment and attack and the surprisingly easy capture by the Germans of Fort Douaumont are give some deeper attention. The entirety of the battle and its phases are subsumed into one, endless, merged mass of unspeakable horror, fuelled by the many personal memoirs, letters and notes that appear to form the bulk of the author's research.

The enduring symbols of the battle, from Petain's "On les aura" to Nivelle's "Ils ne passeront pas", to the Tranchee des Baionettes, the crushed concrete of the forts and the nine villages that were never rebuilt, are all analysed and take their place in the new set of legends and myths that Verdun created for itself. Ousby does not go on to comment on how those myths formed the basis for new and inappropriate conclusions that led directly to ignominy and feat in 1940, but the reader can easily pick out the strands.

The major failings for me are the almost total absence of the German viewpoint and experience, and the reduction of Joffre to a rather boneheaded individual merely bleating for resources for his Somme offensive.

Having said that, I found this a useful work and for the most part a fascinating read. There are some central passages on long-past French history, nationalism and racism that I found slow and at one point almost made me give up, but the pace and focus on the battle itself picks up again and by the conclusion I was glad that I persisted with it.

If I was asked for advice about what to read in order to develop some understanding of French attitudes and politics at Verdun, I would place this second to Horne's "The Fall of Paris: the siege and the Commune, 1870-71 ".

A welcome reprint of a solid account of one of the worst times of the British army's experience in holding the Ypres salient.

The surprise use by the German army of poisonous chlorine gas in the afternoon of 22 April 1915 still has the power to shock and revolt us all. The release of the deadly weapon against men with no power to defend themselves against it led to a large break into the Allied line, with only acts of immense personal courage and determination managing to fight back and hold on. Foremost among these was the counter attack by the Canadians at Kitchener's Wood. This terrible day was only a harbinger of horrors to come as both sides drew in reserves and some of the most costly, horrific and at times chaotic fighting took place.

John Dixon draws on official and regimental accounts, as well as memoirs and some secondary sources. There is a number of sketch maps, which provide a reasonable overview but could perhaps be updated and improved in the event of a future republication. Naturally he covers the opening attack and piecemeal counterattacks in detail, but perhaps more importantly he also positions the battle as taking place while fighting of the fiercest and most violent nature was already taking place at Hill 60, and goes on to describe the broader fighting that only died down in mid May. By that time, the depleted British force had been pushed back much closer to Ypres - effectively onto the start point it would have for the Third Battle which opened on 31 July 1917.

It must be said that John's book presents a very British-sided view. There is little coverage of the vital role played by the French and Belgians and we also get little feel, other than of the launch of the gas, as to German thinking and tactics.

In some ways, novelty of the gas attack aside, Second Ypres has been something of a neglected period. Few Kitchener's men here, no pals battalions being slaughtered as they walked to their doom. No. This was the remnant of the regular army (notably including those 27th and 28th Divisions that were inevitably late to the fray as they were recalled from the furthest outposts of Empire), Cavalry Divisions fighting dismounted, the Indian Corps, gallant Canadians, French and Belgians. The force also included the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, a Territorial formation committed to the battle so soon after they had arrived in France that the men had not seen a trench. The Germans lost 6000 dead in this battle, the British 14000. It should not be forgotten and John's book sets the record straight.

Finally, how good it is to find a book with a good index, excellent bibliography, order of battle and other useful supporting details. In this regard, "Magnificent but not war" is a model of its type.

This is a terrific book: well written, engaging and thorough. Bryn Hammond's entry onto the stage of Great war authorship marks him out as another fine historian to emerge from the University of Birmingham / Imperial War Museum stable.

Cambrai is an enigmatic battle. It is recognised that many of the operational approaches that had such a bearing on the fighting of 1918 made a debut on 20 November 1917 and the days that followed. The battle began so brightly for the British, with a combination of massed tanks and a surprise artillery bombardment breaking with seeming ease into the enemy's formidable and deep defences. So encouraging, such a relief was this after the heartbreaking slog through the mud at Passchendaele that bells were rung at home. Yet within a matter of days it had all gone horribly wrong. The Germans managed to array concentrate reserves and strike back with novel - unmechanised - tactics of their own and by the time the dust had settled both sides had broadly equivalent losses and there had been no strategically important gain of ground. It was another proof that it was possible to break in to an enemy's position, but damnably difficult to break out of it and beyond.

The myth to which the author refers is the characterisation of Cambrai as primarily a tank battle. The early mechanised success of the battle was seized upon in post war years by those in positions of military and political influence who had a tank agenda (Fuller and Liddell Hart predominantly); Cambrai is still the regimental day of the Royal Tank Regiment. Yet as Hammond so ably demonstrates, success at Cambrai was more to do with the effect of the hugely heavy, surprise bombardment and jumping barrage than any other factor. As would be the case in August 1918 - the next occasion on which massed tanks would lead an assault - the effect of tanks soon dwindled as they remained mechanically unreliable and were all too often easy meat for determined enemy artillery. Cambrai was not primarily a tank battle; this is to misinterpret things badly and in so doing miss the point that it was possibly the first time that artillery, tanks, infantry and aircraft combined to such great all-arms effect. The fact that tanks played barely a part in the desperate defensive fight when the Germans struck back should also indicate to the wise that Cambrai means more than tanks.

In some ways, the myth / countermyth aspect of this book is overplayed by the title. Putting it aside, "Cambrai 1917" is an excellent account of the battle. Drawing deeply upon the memories of individuals who were there, left in the form of various artefacts at the Imperial War Museum, and upon much primary documentary evidence, Hammond tells the story as well as it can be told. All the fears, doubts, confusion, elation and weariness of battle are there, as well as the plans, maps, orders and reports. It makes for a very human telling of the story and lifts this book from being a replay of the volume on this battle in the British Official History.

The book includes some good, clear, maps and a selection of photographs. Highly recommended.

Not exactly a book on a battle or campaign, but ket to understanding them.

If you have any interest in the British conduct of the war, this is a vital book for your collection. First published ten years ago and now in a welcome paperback reprint, it is an anthology of scholarly research and fine writing from some of the world's leading historians of the Great War.

As the title suggests, the fourteen papers that make up the book are centred on that most enigmatic and frustrating of soldiers, Sir Douglas Haig. The general stance is unambigious and clearly stated: the authors set out to refute the many myths, untruths and misunderstandings about Haig that for many make him the Devil Incarnate. And they do so with masterly skill, drawing upon a broad range of primary sources and making objective, balanced judgements.

The opening paper, by Dr John Bourne of the University of Birmingham, expresses his depression that arises from the apparent failure of such scholarly work to dislodge the popular view of Haig as a dull, remote, unfeeling butcher of men. The mythology, founded on press disenchantment late in the war, David Lloyd George's scurrilous "War memoirs", the 1960's class-war pacificism of the musical "Oh what a lovely war" and countless "sound bite" repetitions in books and TV since then, now has deep roots. If John was depressed in 1999, he surely will be today, for despite another decade of excellent research and characterisation of Haig, the man-on-the-street view seems unchanged.

You would be hard pressed to find as strong and engaging a collection of work as this in any historical field - and for the price of the paperback it is a steal. The papers by John Hussey, Ian Beckett, David Woodward, Keith Grieves and Stephen Badsey are, in my opinion, particularly strong and cover Haig as a man, his relationships with his predecessor Sir John French, the CIGS Sir William Roberston, the Asquith and Lloyd George Governments and the press. Haig is shown throughout to be a strong, steady, rational leader but his weaknesses and foibles are also ruthlessly exposed. Nigel Cave's work on Haig, his religion and and his lionisation by the British Legion is also novel and offers another insight into how the Haig myths developed. The writing remains fresh and relevant; John Peaty's paper on Haig and military discipline has been to a large extent been overtaken by events (the pardons of those men executed under military law), but even that is a weighty statement as to Haig's position on this and the arguments against pardons.

This is a first class work and strongly recommended.

At last, in the anniversary year of victory, a book that covers a British success. In the welter of work produced in recent years there is still precious little about what I believe to be the most fascinating and "modern" year, 1918, and even less about the fighting that defeated the German army. Peter Hart's "1918" is a splendid example of this year's writing on Haig's victory of the Hundred Days whereas Charles Messenger's book concentrates on the opening action. It is not a huge work or particularly deep in detail, but it covers the ground well and will be useful acquisition for anyone interested in this part of the war.

It is difficult to believe that there is so little written coverage of the Battle of Amiens. It was a short but highly effective action by Fourth Army that built upon French successes of a few days before, and succeeded in punching a hole into the German defences. The attack was spearheaded by the fresh Canadian Corps and relatively fresh Australian Corps, with only III Corps representing the Brits in the mix. Messenger also deals with the often neglected French involvement. Haig's ability to to build on Amiens and develeop a high tempo of operations to maintain offensive action on a number of sectors in France and Flanders was among the key factors that led to the Armistice in November 1918.

Charles Messenger is an accomplished military historian whose previous works will be familiar to many. This book can only add to his reputation. It refers to official histories, unit war diaries and personal accounts to present a readable and thorough account of the action. Amiens is often thought of as a great tank battle, and indeed it was, but he quite rightly examines the effective role of the artillery and the air as decisive factors. Part of the mythology of tanks in the war, so exposed by Bryn Hammond's recent work on Cambrai, is also examined here, in that while Amiens opened with a concentrated force of massed tanks there were few available for a second phase, such were losses to fighting and mechanical failure.

Given the choice of sources, the German side is not covered in great depth: it will be most interesting to see if Jack Sheldon (recent one man English language historian of the German Armies on the Western Front) ever provides us with the opposing view.